In an effort to lure the Taliban to the bargaining table, the Trump administration may ask the Afghan government to postpone presidential elections - a move the Taliban will undoubtedly construe as a sign of American weakness because they have always claimed the Kabul regime as illegitimate.
In that respect, the Taliban are correct. Other than a “presence” in Afghanistan, the United States has no strategic cards to play.
There is no military solution in Afghanistan, at least from the standpoint of the manner in which we have conducted the war.
After an initial small-footprint victory in late 2001, driving the Taliban out of Afghanistan, the U.S. chose to mount an exhaustive and expensive counterinsurgency campaign with its nation-building component.
At the same time, Pakistan, sustaining the Taliban, waged a proxy war in Afghanistan, much like Pakistan’s and, indirectly, China’s reported support and use of the Islamic extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba and its affiliates against India.
Pakistan has always controlled the operation tempo of the war as well as the supply of our troops in landlocked Afghanistan.
U.S. inability or unwillingness to attack Taliban safe havens in Pakistan or forcing Islamabad to withdraw its support, essentially rendered a counterinsurgency victory unachievable. It is an obvious deduction the Pentagon should have made long ago, except for its blind love affair with Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
After 17 years of strategic mismanagement, the Trump administration is left only with bad options. Getting out of Afghanistan is inevitable. Given the current trends, we couldn’t stay even if we wished to do so.
We should let Pakistan and China “win” and then help them ruin their victory.
Clearly, CPEC is the foundation upon which China and Pakistan intend to exploit their triumph, which is highly vulnerable to the very instability they were inciting in Afghanistan.
Forty years ago, Pakistani President Zia ul Haq said that to control Afghanistan, the country should be kept “boiling at the right temperature.”
Like a frog, CPEC will be slowly boiled in South Asia’s pot of instability. CPEC is the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s blueprint for global domination. As the maxim, widely attributed to Napoleon, says “Never interfere with the enemy when he is in the process of destroying himself.”
That is, by harnessing the potential power of ideological fissures, ethnic fault lines and differing national interests, in essence, the ability to manage instability, the U.S. can transform an untenable “presence” into longer-term regional leverage.
Pakistan’s Objectives in Afghanistan
In terms of the end game, Pakistani policy elite see their state as having defined two overriding objectives:
In that respect, the Taliban are correct. Other than a “presence” in Afghanistan, the United States has no strategic cards to play.
There is no military solution in Afghanistan, at least from the standpoint of the manner in which we have conducted the war.
After an initial small-footprint victory in late 2001, driving the Taliban out of Afghanistan, the U.S. chose to mount an exhaustive and expensive counterinsurgency campaign with its nation-building component.
At the same time, Pakistan, sustaining the Taliban, waged a proxy war in Afghanistan, much like Pakistan’s and, indirectly, China’s reported support and use of the Islamic extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba and its affiliates against India.
Pakistan has always controlled the operation tempo of the war as well as the supply of our troops in landlocked Afghanistan.
U.S. inability or unwillingness to attack Taliban safe havens in Pakistan or forcing Islamabad to withdraw its support, essentially rendered a counterinsurgency victory unachievable. It is an obvious deduction the Pentagon should have made long ago, except for its blind love affair with Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
After 17 years of strategic mismanagement, the Trump administration is left only with bad options. Getting out of Afghanistan is inevitable. Given the current trends, we couldn’t stay even if we wished to do so.
We should let Pakistan and China “win” and then help them ruin their victory.
Clearly, CPEC is the foundation upon which China and Pakistan intend to exploit their triumph, which is highly vulnerable to the very instability they were inciting in Afghanistan.
Forty years ago, Pakistani President Zia ul Haq said that to control Afghanistan, the country should be kept “boiling at the right temperature.”
Like a frog, CPEC will be slowly boiled in South Asia’s pot of instability. CPEC is the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s blueprint for global domination. As the maxim, widely attributed to Napoleon, says “Never interfere with the enemy when he is in the process of destroying himself.”
That is, by harnessing the potential power of ideological fissures, ethnic fault lines and differing national interests, in essence, the ability to manage instability, the U.S. can transform an untenable “presence” into longer-term regional leverage.
The U.S. Defense Department’s own metrics suggest that Afghanistan’s insurgents are nowhere near losing.
The percentage of the country’s 407 districts under government control has decreased from 66 percent in May 2016 to 56 percent in May of this year. Over the same two-year period, the number of areas under Taliban or insurgent control has risen, as did the number of districts considered “contested,”
The U.S. presence in Afghanistan safeguards two vital interests: the need to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and to eliminate terrorist safe havens. But the United States could ensure those interests without staying in Afghanistan forever.
Pakistan’s Objectives in Afghanistan
In terms of the end game, Pakistani policy elite see their state as having defined two overriding objectives:
■The “settlement”in Afghanistan should not lead to a negative spillover such that it contributes to further instability in Pakistan or causes resentment among Pakistani Pashtuns; and
Pakistani policy faces a dilemma vis-à-vis the U.S. On the one hand, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan are believed to be causing an internal backlash in terms of militancy and deepening the state-society rift within Pakistan.
■ The government in Kabul should not be antagonistic to Pakistan and should not allow its territory to be used against Pakistani state interests.
A degree of stability in Afghanistan: Project participants felt that Pakistan’s interests are best served by a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards Pakistan.
There was across the board realization among the participants that persistent instability in Afghanistan will have numerous and predictable consequences for Pakistan that it is ill-prepared to tackle.
An inclusive government in Kabul: Pakistan prefers a negotiated configuration with adequate Pashtun representation that is recognized by all ethnic and political stakeholders in Afghanistan. Some of the opinion makers insisted that given the current situation, a sustainable arrangement would necessarily require the main Taliban factions –
particularly Mullah Omar’s “Quetta Shura” Taliban and the Haqqani network – to be part of the new political arrangement. Limiting Indian presence to development activities: Pakistani foreign policy elite accept that India has a role to play in
Afghanistan’s economic progress and prosperity. However, many participants perceived the present Indian engagement to be going beyond strictly development. They wish to see greater transparency on Indian actions and objectives.
On the other hand, Pakistani policy elite appreciate that a premature U.S. troop withdrawal would lead to added instability in Afghanistan. Participants felt that from Islamabad
